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Abstract 
This study investigates whether the competence of central bank governors affect the stability of the 
financial system they are responsible for. Using publicly available information about central bank 
governors from 2000 to 2016 together with data on financial stability and the macro-economy, the 
findings reveal that central bank governors’ competence promotes financial stability, depending on how 
competence is measured. Specifically, the findings reveal that the financial system is more stable when 
the central bank governor is older and male. The financial system is also stable during the tenure of a 
central bank governor that has a combination of cognitive ability, social capital and technical 
competence in economics. The gender analyses reveal that the financial system is also stable during the 
tenure of a female central bank governor that has high social capital or high cognitive abilities while 
the financial system is relatively less stable during the tenure of a male central bank governor that has 
high social capital or high cognitive abilities. Comparing developed countries to developing and 
transition countries, the findings reveal that the financial system of developed countries is more stable 
during the tenure of a central bank governor that has high cognitive ability, social capital and technical 
competence in economics while the financial system of developing and transition countries is less stable 
during the tenure of a central bank governor that has high cognitive ability, social capital and technical 
competence in economics. Also, there is evidence that the financial system of developing and transition 
countries is more stable during the tenure of a central bank governor that has knowledge in disciplines 
other than economics. The findings are consistent with the view that certain characteristics of central 
bankers shape their beliefs, preferences and choice of policy, which in turn, are consequential for policy 
outcomes during their tenure. 
 
JEL classification: G21, G28 
Keywords: Financial stability, central bank governor, financial system, banking stability, competence, 
education, gender, financial institutions, economics, financial crisis, loan loss provisions, 
nonperforming loans, regulatory capital, inflation rate, real interest rate, GDP growth rate. 
 
This version: May, 2020. 
 
 
 
P.K. Ozili                                Does competence of central bank governors influence financial stability 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
Every country needs a stable financial system. Usually, the head of the government appoints a person 
who will be responsible to manage the financial system over a defined period of time. We call this 
individual ‘the central bank governor’, although different countries may use different names to describe 
the individual such as ‘chief regulator’, ‘central bank leader’, etc. The central bank governor is 
responsible for financial stability in the financial system, and is also responsible for macroeconomic 
stability in the economic system (Mishra and Reshef, 2019). The central bank governor is also 
responsible for ensuring that financial institutions in the financial sector provide funds to the real sector 
for the production of goods and services, thus, leading to economic growth. To achieve the goals of 
financial and macroeconomic stability, central bank governors are expected to use their competence – 
skills, knowledge and experience – and should work with other parties to manage the financial and 
economic system (Mishra and Reshef, 2019). 
The competence of central bank governors can influence the extent of financial regulation, the severity 
of regulatory sanctions, the level of systemic risks in the financial system, the kind of monetary policy 
decisions that are made, how the economy is managed, and the type of interventions in the economy 
during bad times in a country (Kuttner and Posen, 2010). Romer and Romer (2004) show that the choice 
of central bank governor can substantially influence policy outcomes, especially factors such as some 
education in economics, experience on Wall Street, experience in public service, and their own writings 
and statements. These two studies have shown that the competence of central bank governors can 
influence policy outcomes, which suggest that competence should be taken into consideration when 
choosing central bank governors. But no studies have examined the relationship between central bank 
governors’ competence and financial stability, and this is the gap in the literature which this study seeks 
to fill. 
Existing studies on financial stability focus largely on financial crisis scenarios and stress testing (Alfaro 
and Drehmann, 2009; Kapinos and Mitnik, 2016), financial stability determinants (Hirtle and Lehnert, 
2015, Ozili, 2018), the effect of central bank governor changes on stock markets (Moser and Dreher, 
2010), the effect of past employment and educational characteristics of central bank governors in the 
design of financial regulation (Mishra and Reshef, 2019), and the factors that propagate contagion in 
financial systems (Allen and Gale, 2000; Glasserman and Young, 2015). But these studies did not 
explore the role of the competence of central bank governors in influencing the policies that financial 
stability depends on. This paper is the first attempt to examine the relationship between central bank 
governor’s competence and financial stability.  
Does the competence of the central bank governor affect financial stability? This is the question we 
address in this paper. If a new central bank governor is appointed by the government on the basis of 
competence alone, will superior (or poor) competence be the reason for financial stability (or 
instability)? Surprisingly, there is scant empirical research addressing this question. We focus on 
‘competence’ which is a specific characteristic of central bank governors. In the literature, competence 
is a characteristic of an individual that has been shown to drive superior job performance (Hartle, 1995: 
p.107), such as visible knowledge, skill, experience and other underlying elements of competencies like 
traits and motives (Le Deist and Winterton, 2005). We focus on the ‘competence’ of the central bank 
governor because of the prevailing view in central banking settings that the central bank governor’s 
experience and competence is an important determinant of which policies are implemented and which 
policies are not implemented during their tenure (Mishra and Reshef, 2019). Yet, research in finance 
and economics so far has given little consideration to how the central bank governor’s characteristics 
affect financial stability. 
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Using a dataset of publicly available information on central bank governors, this paper examines 
whether the competence of central bank governors is a determinant of financial stability during their 
tenure. Using the fixed-effect regression methodology, the findings reveal that (i) the central bank 
governor’s competence promotes financial stability, (ii) the financial system is more stable during the 
tenure of a central bank governor that is male and older, (iii) the financial system is also stable during 
the tenure of a central bank governor that has a combination of cognitive ability, social capital and 
technical competence in economics. The findings from the gender analyses reveal that the financial 
system is also stable during the tenure of a female central bank governor that has high social capital or 
high cognitive ability. Also, there is evidence that the financial system of developing and transition 
countries is more stable during the tenure of a central bank governor that has knowledge in disciplines 
other than economics. 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. Firstly, we add to the financial stability 
literature by introducing the competence of the central bank governor as a determinant of financial 
stability. Secondly, the study contributes to the literature that examine the effect of central bank 
governors’ characteristics on financial regulation (see Kuttner and Posen, 2010; Moser and Dreher, 
2010; Mishra and Reshef, 2019). These studies show that certain characteristics of central bank 
governors can influence the dynamics of financial regulation. Finally, our analysis contributes to the 
literature that identify the determinants of financial crises (see Brunnermeier et al, 2009; Ozili, 2018, 
2020). The analysis in this study focus on established indicators of financial stability and show how 
stability outcomes may depend on the competence of central bank governors. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. Section 3 
presents the related literature and develops the hypothesis. Section 4 presents the data and methodology. 
Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. Upper echelon theory 
The competence of central bank governors can be understood in the context of upper echelon theory. 
Upper echelon theory is a management theory which states that an organisation is a reflection of the 
characteristics of its top-level management team (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). It argues that the 
strategic decisions and policies adopted by members of an organization’s upper echelon are a reflection 
of their personal experiences, values, personalities, managerial background and other similar 
characteristics. This implies that the executives' experiences, values and personalities can influence 
their interpretations of the situations they face and, in turn, can affect their choices (Hambrick, 2007). 
Therefore, following the upper echelon theory, central bank governors’ characteristics can influence the 
interpretation of the situations they face in managing the financial system and, in turn, can affect their 
choice of policy to correct financial imbalances in the financial system. Thus, to better understand the 
policies underlying financial system stability, one should understand the characteristics of the central 
bank governors who lead the policy making process. 
2.2. Competence 
Competence is a characteristic that drive superior job performance by an individual such as visible 
knowledge, skill, experience, traits and motives (Le Deist and Winterton, 2005; (Hartle, 1995: p.107). 
Weinert (2001) identified nine different ways in which competence has been defined or interpreted. 
These include: general cognitive ability; specialized cognitive skills; competence performance model; 
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modified competence-performance model; objective and subjective self-concepts; motivated action 
tendencies; action competence; key competencies; meta-competencies. Also, resource based theory 
suggest that managers can offer two types of resources: ‘human capital’ as indicated by their experience 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; McGee et al., 1995), and ‘social capital’ as indicated by their 
external ties to politicians, business elites and government officials (Granovetter, 1985; Shane and 
Cable, 2002). These two resources ‘human capital’ and ‘social capital’ can help central bank governors 
to leverage and exploit other resources to improve the way they manage the financial system.  
2.3.  Should the Central Bank Governor Matter? 
There are three perspectives on this. The first perspective is the ‘heterogeneous and collaborative leader’ 
perspective. Under this perspective, the Central bank governor can be viewed as an agent who 
introduces heterogeneous and selfless inputs into the financial system regulatory process. The agent 
allows external parties and other interested parties to participate and contribute some significant inputs 
into the policy making process. The agent oversees the process and is advised on which policy options 
should be enforced. Decisions are made collectively and the agent is expected to endorse the collective 
decisions of the team. Under this perspective, the Central bank governor (the agent) does not matter for 
what is going on within the regulatory policy setting because replacing one central bank governor with 
another central bank governor will not significantly affect the nature and intensity of financial regulation 
which financial stability depend on. 
The second perspective is the ‘homogenous and self-serving leader’ perspective. Under this perspective, 
the central bank governor can be viewed as an agent who introduces competence as personalised inputs 
gained from experience, education and association, into the decision making process for financial 
regulation. The agent does not allow external parties to participate or contribute to the policy making 
process, preferring to work only with existing regulatory officials. The agent introduces a significant 
amount of personalised decisions into the regulatory process and may seek counsel from existing 
regulatory officials to determine which policy options should be enforced in the financial system. Under 
this perspective, the Central bank governor matter for what is going on within the regulatory policy 
setting because replacing one central bank governor with another central bank governor will 
significantly affect the nature and intensity of financial regulation which financial stability depends on.  
The third perspective is the ‘performance contract’ perspective. This perspective partly aligns with 
agency theory in that its argues that the Central bank governor has significant discretion and can use his 
or her competence to alter policy decisions to advance what he or she thinks is the right thing to do. The 
Central bank governor can impose his or her own idiosyncratic regulatory style on the financial sector. 
If the Central bank governor’s regulatory style does not promote greater stability in the financial system, 
the Central bank governor will be pressured to change his or her regulatory style by the Board or through 
regulatory gaming by regulated entities. And of course, the extent to which this can occur will depend 
on whether the Board has the ability to control the decisions of the Central bank governor. Most often, 
the Central bank governor is a political executive and has greater power than the members of the Board 
combined, which can limit the ability of the Board to control the decisions of the Central bank governor. 
Under this perspective, the Central bank governor matters for what is going on within the regulatory 
policy setting. 
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3. Related literature and hypothesis development 
3.1. Related literature 
Some studies investigate the personality traits of central bank governors, and the factors that lead to the 
appointment and exit of central bank governors. For instance, Romer and Romer (2004) argue that an 
important determinant of policy success of a central bank governor is the central bank governor’s views 
about how the economy works and his or her views on what monetary policy can accomplish. This 
suggest that the choice of a central bank governor is based on the individual’s personal idiosyncrasies 
such as their own writings and statements on the economy. Other studies examine the causes and effect 
of the appointment of a new central bank governor. Kuttner and Posen (2010) examine the effects of 
the appointment of central bank governors and financial market expectations on monetary policy. They 
conducted an event study based on dataset of appointment announcements from 15 countries. They find 
that there was a significant reaction of exchange rates and bond yields to unexpected appointments of 
Central bank governors. Other studies examine the factors that lead to the exit of central bank governors. 
Dreher et al (2010) examine the factors that lead to the removal of a central bank governor before the 
end of their tenure. They conducted a multi-country analyses, and find that political instability, regime 
instability, the occurrence of elections, and the ratio of private credit to GDP increases the likelihood 
of Central bank governor exit before the end of their tenure. They also observe that different factors 
lead to the removal of Central bank governors in OECD countries versus non-OECD countries while 
factors such as frequent elections were a common factor in the two country-group. Also, Moser and 
Dreher (2010) examine the reactions of financial markets to central bank governor exits. Using daily 
data set for 20 emerging markets during 1992 to 2006, they find that the replacement of a central bank 
governor negatively affected financial markets on the announcement day. Their findings suggest that 
newly appointed central bank governors suffer from a systematic credibility problem at the beginning 
of their tenure. Ennser‐Jedenastik (2014) show that central bank governors that are affiliated with the 
ruling political party are more likely to survive to the end of their tenure compared to central bank 
governors that affiliated with the opposition party. 
The financial stability literature so far has not addressed the question of whether the central bank 
governor’s competence promotes or hinder sustained stability in the banking system. While this is an 
important question, the extent to which this question can be answered depends on what we mean by 
financial stability. There are numerous definitions for financial stability. For instance, financial stability 
is the absence of financial crises or the ability of the financial system to withstand shocks. Some scholars 
link financial stability to banking stability. Brunnermeier et al (2009) demonstrate that banking stability 
is the absence of banking crises which is achieved through the stability of all banks in the banking 
sector. Similarly, Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) argue that banking stability is the stability of banks 
linked to each other directly through the interbank deposit market and participations in syndicated loans, 
or indirectly through lending to common sectors and proprietary trades. A stable banking system will 
efficiently allocate resources from savers to borrowers, manage lending risks and maintain manageable 
levels of risk. On the other hand, banking system instability occurs when the banking system fails to 
perform its function, leading to a crisis. A resilient and stable financial system will absorb abnormal 
shocks primarily through self-corrective mechanisms to prevent adverse events from having a disruptive 
effect on the financial system and the real economy. A stable financial system is also resilient to stress 
(Goodhart, 2006; Haldane, 2009; Jones and Hilbers, 2004). 
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3.2. Hypothesis development 
3.2.1. Specialist education hypothesis 
The education of the central bank governor can influence financial system stability. This is because one 
of the key qualities of a successful central bank governor is being knowledgeable about the exact 
workings of financial markets and economic systems which requires a thorough understanding of the 
economics discipline (Hallerberg and Wehner, 2013). Having specialist knowledge of the economics 
discipline allows the central bank governor to use his or her knowledge and available information to 
make robust policy decisions to ensure stability in the financial system (Göhlmann and Vaubel, 2007). 
Therefore, we predict a positive relationship between the central bank governor’s competence 
(measured as education in economics) and financial system stability. Our methodology for determining 
the competence of central bank governors is a Ph.D. in economics. Our argument for this metric is based 
on the fact that a Ph.D. in economics ensures at least a good understanding of macroeconomics. 
h1: central bank governors’ competence, measured as education, positively influence financial stability. 
 
3.2.2. Cognitive ability hypothesis 
The cognitive ability of the central bank governor can influence financial system stability. This is 
because one of the key qualities of a successful central bank governor is his or her ability to put together 
and use all available information to make key policy decisions to promote stability in the financial 
system. A measure of cognitive ability is the quality of University attended according to Gottesman and 
Morey (2006). Being educated at an elite University can improve the central bank governor’s ability to 
process large information which should positively correlate with his or her ability to design policies that 
promote stability in the financial system. Additionally, a central bank governor that was educated in a 
global elite university will have more mentoring opportunities from the best economists in elite 
universities and will have valuable networking opportunities with other foreign policy makers who visit 
elite institutions to attend policy conferences. Moreover, research in psychology1 has shown that 
individuals with higher intelligence, regardless of how intelligence is measured, are able to process 
existing and new information more quickly than less intelligent individuals (Deary, 2000). Our method 
for determining the cognitive ability of a central bank governor is to use the prestige of the higher 
institution or university attended by the central bank governor as a proxy for his or her cognitive ability. 
This means that a central bank governor that attended an elite university is considered to have high 
cognitive abilities based on the fact that the entrance requirements and standards to study in elite 
universities are high, and one’s ability to gain entry into an elite university’s program is indicative of 
high intelligence. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between higher cognitive ability and 
financial stability. 
h2: central bank governors’ competence, measured as cognitive ability, positively influence financial 
system stability 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Deary (2000). 
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3.2.3. Social capital hypothesis 
Daily and Johnson (1997) show that executives with foreign or elite education have more influence and 
social capital in their organisations. For this study, social capital refers to social ties and networks gained 
by the central bank governor because of his or her foreign education. The foreign education of the 
central bank governor provides a measure, to some extent, of the central bank governor’s social capital, 
and it is well known that foreign education can be a strong indicator of social prestige and class status 
(Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993). Indeed, one can posit that a large part of why the central bank 
governor rose to his or her position of influence, or why he or she was politically appointed is partly 
due to their social networks gained through their foreign education. In addition to using social capital 
for personal advancement in his or her career, the central bank governor can use his or her social capital 
and social networks to solicit advice from foreign central bank governors if necessary. For example, a 
central bank governor with strong social ties to regulators in other countries can receive solutions to 
solve tough economic problems. Our method for determining the social capital of the central bank 
governor is whether the central bank governor obtained his or her highest educational qualification from 
a foreign university. Our argument for this metric is based on the fact that those educated in foreign 
universities benefit from networking opportunities with their peers and also benefit from mentoring 
opportunities by top scholars in economics and finance. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship 
between the central bank governor’s social capital and financial system stability. 
h3: central bank governors’ competence, measured as social capital, influences financial system 
stability 
 
4. Methods 
4.1. Data 
The central bank governor, in this study, refers to the governor of each national central bank, which 
excludes the governor of regional central banks such as the European central bank and the Central bank 
of West African States (WAEMU). The information of Central Bank governors was collected for 40 
countries covering the 2000 to 2016 period. The biological information and information on the 
competence of the Central bank governor such as their exact age, gender and education characteristics 
was collected from multiple public sources mainly: the official Wikipedia page of the Central bank 
governor, publicly available (or online) curriculum vitae of Central bank governors, and from Central 
Bank websites (see table 1).  
During our data collection process, each information collected from one public source was compared 
with the same information reported in other public sources to ensure the data are consistent and accurate. 
However, we observed that many countries did not have any publicly available information about their 
Central bank governors. A basic internet search showed that there was limited information about the 
age, and education of the central bank governor for many countries. Also, we noticed that many 
countries had incomplete publicly available information about their Central bank governors and such 
incomplete data can introduce bias in the data. There were also cases where the biological information 
of the central bank governors for some countries was not sufficient enough to cover a 16-year (2000 to 
2016). Therefore, for data quality reasons, we excluded the countries that do not have any publicly 
available information, we also excluded countries that have incomplete data about their central bank 
governors as well as countries that had a short reporting history of information about central bank 
governors. After removing these countries, we made sure that there is a balanced country sample, for 
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instance, we ensured that the sample contain countries that have had a female central bank governor in 
the past to enable comparison with their male counterparts. Also, we did not include some countries 
that have had an all-male governor in their central banking history in order to have a more fairly 
balanced sample. We also included some developing countries into the sample – although this category 
was fewer due to unavailable or incomplete information. The resulting final sample consist of 16 
countries that met the selection criteria. 
Macroeconomic data was also collected, to capture the effect of the macro economy on financial 
stability, from the World Economic Forum database. Data for financial stability indicators was collected 
from the World Bank’s Global Financial development indicators database. The financial stability 
indicators are the dependent variables. The countries in our sample include: United States, United 
Kingdom, Italy, Germany, France, Russia, South Africa, Canada, Malaysia, Botswana, Serbia, Nigeria, 
Thailand, China, Mexico and Argentina. Finally, the descriptive statistics for the data are reported in 
Appendix A1. 
Table 1: Information on Central Bank Governors 
S/N Country Name Year Gender Obtained Ph.D. Economics before appointment 
1 United States Alan Greenspan 2000-2005 M Yes 
 Ben Bernanke 2006-2013 M Yes 
 Janet Yellen 2014-2016 F Yes 
2 United Kingdom Edward Alan John George 2000-2002 M No 
 Mervyn King 2003-2012 M No 
 Mark Carney 2013-2016 M Yes 
3 Italy Antonio Fazio 2000-2004 M No 
 Draghi 2005-2010 M Yes 
 Ignazio Visco 2011-2016 M Yes 
4 Germany Ernst Welteke 2000-2003 M Yes 
 Axel Alfred Weber 2004-2010 M Yes 
 Jens Weidmann 2011-2016 M Yes 
5 France Jean-Claude Trichet 2000-2002 M No 
 Christian Noyer 2003-2014 M No 
 François Villeroy De Galhau 2015-2016 M No 
6 Russia Viktor Gerashchenko 2000-2001 M No 
 Sergey Ignatyev 2002-2012 M Yes 
 Elvira Nabiullina 2013-2016 F Yes 
7 South Africa Tito Mboweni 2000-2008 M No 
 Gill Marcus 2009-2013 F No 
 Lesetja Kganyago 2014-2016 M No 
8 Canada Gordon Thiessen 2000 M Yes 
 David A. Dodge 2001-2007 M Yes 
 Mark Carney 2008-2012 M Yes 
 Stephen Poloz 2013-2016 M Yes 
9 Malaysia Zeti Akhtar Aziz 2000-2015 F Yes 
 Muhammad Bin Ibrahim 2016 M Yes 
10 Botswana Linah Mohohlo 2000-2016 F No 
11 Nigeria Joseph Sanusi 2000-2004 M No 
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Charles Soludo 2005-2009 M Yes 
Sanusi Lamido 2009-2014 M No 
Emefiele Godwin 2014-2016 M No 
12 Serbia Mlađan Dinkić 2000-2003 M No 
 Kori Udovički 2003-2014 F Yes 
 Radovan Jelašić 2004-2010 M No 
 Dejan Šoškić 2010-2012 M No 
 Jorgovanka Tabaković 2012-2016 F Yes 
13 Thailand Chatumongol Sonakul 2000-2001 M No 
 Pridiyathorn Devakula 2001-2006 M No 
 Tarisa Watanagase 2006-2010 F Yes 
 Prasarn Trairatvorakul 2010-2015 M No 
 Veerathai Santiprabhob 2015-2016 M Yes 
14 China Dai Xianglong 2000-2002 M No 
 Zhou Xiaochuan 2002-2016 M No 
15 Mexico Guillermo Ortiz Martínez 2000-2009 M Yes 
 Agustín Carstens 2010-2016 M Yes 
16 Argentina Pedro Pou 2000-2001 M No 
 Aldo Pignanelli 2002 M No  
 Hernán Martín Pérez Redrado 2003-2009 M No  
 Mercedes Marcó del Pont 2010-2011 F No  
 Juan Carlos Fábrega 2013 M No  
 Alejandro Vanoli 2013-2015 M No  
 Federico Sturzenegger 2016 M No  
 
4.2. Model specification 
In the model, financial stability is expressed as a function of the competence of the central bank 
governor, the biological characteristics of the central bank governor and the macroeconomic factors 
affecting financial stability. 𝑆𝐵𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝑃𝐸𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝐸𝐸𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝐸𝐴𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑃𝐷𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖, 𝑡+  𝛽7 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽8 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽9 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛽10 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝑒 
Where 
SB = a vector of dependent variables representing LLC, RISK, NPL and CAR. 
LLC = loan loss provisions to nonperforming loans ratio (%) 
CRISIS = banking crisis dummy variable (1 = banking crisis, 0 = none) 
RISK = bank Z-score 
NPL = bank nonperforming loans to gross loans ratio (%) 
CAR = bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets ratio (%) 
PE = technical competence, measured by whether central bank governor had a PhD in economics prior 
to being appointed 
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EE = cognitive ability, measured by whether the central bank governor was educated in a global elite 
university or institution prior to being appointed 
EA = social capital, measured by whether the central bank governor had foreign education 
PD = technical knowledge in a discipline other than economics, measured by whether the central bank 
governor has a specialist knowledge in disciplines other than Economics prior to being appointed 
Age = the age of the central bank governor 
MALE = a dummy variable that take the value ‘1’ if the governor is male, and ‘0’ if female 
FEMALE = a binary variable that take the value ‘1’ if the governor is female, and ‘0’ if male 
INF = inflation rate 
INT = real interest rate 
GDPR = GDP growth rate 
e = error term. 
Appendix A2 presents the variable description. 
 
4.3. Justification of variables 
The financial stability vector variable (SB) is the dependent variable. The SB variable is a vector of 
four dependent variables that represent different measures of financial stability namely the z-score 
which measures insolvency risk (RISK), nonperforming loan ratio (NPL), regulatory capital ratio 
(CAR) and loan loss coverage ratio (LLC). The first dependent variable is the ‘RISK’ variable. ‘RISK’ 
is measured  using the z-score2 which represent the level of insolvency risk in the banking system 
(Lepetit and Strobel, 2013, Ozili, 2018). A high RISK value indicates that the banking sector is more 
stable because it is inversely related to the probability of bank insolvency (Lepetit and Strobel, 2013), 
and the expectation is that a central bank governor would ensure that the banking system has a low level 
of insolvency risk during their tenure, leading to greater financial stability.  
The second dependent variable is the level of nonperforming loans (NPL) which measures asset quality. 
The NPL variable is commonly used in the literature to measure financial stability (Manu et al, 2011; 
Kasman and Kasman, 2015; Chang et al, 2008, Ozili, 2018). A low NPL ratio indicates high asset 
quality, and high asset quality in the banking sector generally improves financial stability. The 
expectation is that a central bank governor would ensure that the banking system has a low level of 
nonperforming loans, which improves financial stability. The third dependent variable is the ‘LLC’ 
variable, measured as the ratio of loan loss provisions to nonperforming loans. The LLC ratio measures 
the extent that non-performing loans are covered by loan loss provisions. The LLC ratio is commonly 
used in the literature to measure financial stability (Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2018). A high LLC 
ratio indicates higher safety against expected loan losses in the banking system which also improves 
                                                          
2
 The z-score measures the insolvency risk of the banking sector calculated at bank level as return on 
assets (ROA) plus the capital to asset ratio (CAR) divided by the standard deviation of asset returns. 
RISK = Zscore = (ROA+ CAR)/SDROA, where ROA is the rate of return on assets, CAR is the 
capital to asset ratio, and SDROA is an estimate of the standard deviation of the rate of return on 
assets. 
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financial system stability. The expectation is that a central bank governor would ensure the banking 
system has a high loan loss coverage ratio.  
The fourth dependent variable is the regulatory capital variable ‘CAR’. The CAR ratio reflects the 
capital that banks are required to set aside for the risks they take (Agénor et al, 2013; Berger et al, 1995). 
A high CAR ratio indicates that the banking system is well-capitalised and has the capacity to absorb 
unexpected losses and is, therefore, safe (Brunnermeier et al, 2009). The expectation is that the central 
bank governor would ensure the banking system has high regulatory capital ratio to mitigate unexpected 
losses and other negative spill-overs from the risk-taking activities of financial institutions. The fifth 
dependent variable is the ‘CRISIS’ variable. The CRISIS variable is a binary variable which measures 
whether the banking system has witnessed a significant financial distress, (as indicated by significant 
bank runs, sudden banking system shutdown, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations) 
during the period. The CRISIS variable takes the value ‘1’ if there has been a significant banking crisis, 
and ‘0’ otherwise.  
The explanatory variables are the competence variables, biographical characteristics variables and the 
macroeconomic variables. The competence of the central bank governor is measured using four 
variables: technical knowledge in economics (PE), cognitive ability (EE), social capital (EA), and 
knowledge in a discipline other than economics (PD). The ‘PE’ variable reflects central bank governors’ 
technical knowledge in economics, which signals their ability to manage the economy and the financial 
system. The ‘PE’ variable is measured by whether the central bank governor obtained a PhD in 
economics before being appointed as governor of the central bank (Göhlmann and Vaubel, 2007; 
Hallerberg and Wehner, 2013). Göhlmann and Vaubel (2007) confirms that knowledge of economics 
is crucial to manage any financial and economic system (Göhlmann and Vaubel, 2007). The PE variable 
takes the value ‘1’ if the central bank governor had a PhD in economics prior to appointment, and zero 
otherwise. The expectation is that there should be greater financial stability and greater macroeconomic 
stability during the tenure of a central bank governor that has technical knowledge in economics.  
The ‘EE’ variable reflects the cognitive ability of the central bank governor. Deary (2000) show that 
individuals with high intelligence, regardless of how intelligence is measured, are better able to process 
existing and new information more quickly than less intelligent individuals (Wai and Rindermann, 
2015). The EE variable is measured by whether central bank governors obtained their highest 
qualification from a global elite university or learning institution 3. Elite universities establish a rigorous 
selection process in selecting new students to be admitted for specific academic programs so that only 
the best and the most intelligent are selected (Detterman, 2014; Furnham et al, 2003). Therefore, gaining 
entry into an elite academic institution is used as a proxy for high intelligence or high cognitive ability 
particularly in elite institutions such as Harvard, Yale, MIT, Stanford, Princeton, Pennsylvania, 
Cambridge and Oxford Universities. Accordingly, the ‘EE’ variable takes the value ‘1’ if the central 
bank governor obtained his or her highest educational qualification from a global elite university, and 
zero otherwise. More specifically, the ‘EE’ variable takes the value ‘1’ if the central bank governor 
obtained his or her highest educational qualification from Harvard, Yale, MIT, Stanford, Princeton, 
Pennsylvania, Cambridge and Oxford Universities, and take the value ‘0’ if central bank governors did 
not obtain their highest degrees from elite universities. The expectation is that there should be greater 
                                                          
3
 The global elite universities or learning institutions are - Harvard, Yale, MIT, Stanford, Princeton, Pennsylvania, 
Cambridge and Oxford Universities. The ‘EE’ variable takes the value ‘1’ if the central bank governor obtained 
his or her highest educational qualification from Harvard, Yale, MIT, Stanford, Princeton, Pennsylvania, 
Cambridge and Oxford Universities, and take the value ‘0’ if central bank governors did not gain their highest 
degrees from these universities. 
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financial stability and greater macroeconomic stability during the tenure of a central bank governor with 
high cognitive ability. 
The ‘EA’ variable measures the social capital of central bank governors which is gained mostly through 
foreign education. The social capital gained through foreign education helps central bank governors to 
increase their extensive social networks, interpersonal relationships, shared understanding, shared 
norms and shared values derived from their exposure to alternative economic systems, their exposure 
to different schools of economic thought and their exposure to foreign banking systems and 
environment. This is also consistent with social capital theory which argue that social relationships are 
resources that can lead to the development and accumulation of human capital (Dubos, 2017). Having 
foreign education increases social capital because it gives the central bank governor an opportunity to 
meet new people, learn about new systems and build new relationships that allows for social networking 
in areas of shared interests, norms and values. The ‘EA’ variable takes the value ‘1’ if the central bank 
governor obtained his/her highest educational qualification from a foreign university or learning 
institution, and ‘0’ otherwise. The expectation is that there should be greater financial stability and 
greater macroeconomic stability during the tenure of a central bank governor that has high social capital 
gained through foreign education. The ‘PD’ variable reflects the central bank governor’s technical 
knowledge in disciplines other than economics such as having a master’s degree in finance, accounting 
or business administration; as well as having a PhD in finance, accounting or management or having 
some professional certifications which signals the central bank governor’s knowledge in a specific 
discipline. The PD variable takes the value ‘1’ if the central bank governor has technical knowledge in 
a discipline other than economics prior to appointment, and zero otherwise. The expectation is that there 
should be greater financial stability and greater macroeconomic stability during the tenure of a central 
bank governor that has technical knowledge in non-economics discipline. 
We also control for some biological characteristics of the central bank governor using the age and 
gender of the governor. The ‘AGE’ variable measures the exact age of the central bank governor. 
Generally, older executives have more experience in business management and tend to become more 
risk-averse as they grow older compared to younger executives since older executives tend to apply 
conservative discretion when making strategic decisions in organisations (Nakano and Nguyen, 2011; 
Peni, 2014). Similarly, we expect that older central bank governors would be risk-averse in their 
regulatory policy making and ensure that the risks in the financial system is low to promote stability in 
the financial system. Therefore, the expectation is that older central bank governors would be more risk 
averse, which is beneficial for the financial system.  
We also control for the influence of gender on financial stability. The literature has examined the effect 
of CEO gender on firm performance (see., Faccio et al, 2016; Zeng and Wang, 2015). Similarly, we 
seek to identify the effect of central bank governors’ gender on financial stability. To do this, two gender 
binary variables were introduced into the model, namely: ‘MALE’ and ‘FEMALE’. The ‘MALE’ 
binary variable takes the value ‘1’ if the central bank governor is male and ‘0’ if female, while the 
‘FEMALE’ binary variable takes the value ‘1’ if the central bank governor is female and ‘0’ is male. 
Finally, we control for the possible effect of macroeconomic factors on financial stability such as 
inflation, real interest rate and GDP growth rate (GDPR). High inflation and high real interest rates will 
make lending costlier which will increase the cost of financial intermediation which, in turn, can trigger 
defaults on loan repayments and lead to instability in the financial system (Ajello et al, 2016; Woodford, 
2012; Ellis and Littrell, 2017). The GDP growth rate variable (GDPR) reflect the state of the business 
cycle. The state of the business cycle, such as economic downturns and upturns, can affect financial 
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stability, and there is evidence that financial systems tend to be stable in periods of economic prosperity 
while financial systems tend to be unstable during economic recessions (Mishkin, 2000; Taylor, 2015).  
The fixed effect regression estimator was used to estimate the effect of central bank governor’s 
competence on financial stability. An alternative estimation technique is the GMM regression estimator. 
The GMM reduces the degrees of freedom and further reduces the number of observations in the sample 
due to the lagged dependent variable in the estimation. The potential reduction in the number 
observations when GMM is used, the presence of many binary variables, and the possible collinearity 
among the binary variable, makes it inappropriate to use GMM. Therefore, the fixed effect regression 
estimator was used. 
 
5. Discussion of Results 
5.1. Main results 
The empirical result is reported in Table 2. Using the ‘LLC’ variable as the dependent variable for 
financial stability in Column 1 of Table 2, the competence variables (PE, EE and EA coefficients) are 
insignificant except for PD coefficient. The PD coefficient is negative and significant, which indicates 
that the financial system has less safety against expected losses during the tenure of a central bank 
governor that has technical knowledge in other disciplines other than economics. The AGE coefficient 
is positive and significant, which confirms the expectation that older chief executives (such as a central 
bank governor) are more risk-averse as they get older, and this is consistent with Nakano and Nguyen 
(2011) and Peni (2014). The result suggest that older central bank governors ensure that the financial 
(banking) system has high level of provisions to nonperforming loans ratio to cover expected losses 
during their tenure which improves financial stability. For the macroeconomic variables, only the 
GDPR coefficient is positive and significant, which suggest that the financial system has greater safety 
during economic booms.   
Using the ‘NPL’ variable as the dependent variable for financial stability in Column 2 of Table 2, the 
EE coefficient is positive and significant, which indicates that there is a positive association between 
nonperforming loans and a central bank governor’s social capital. This implies that appointing central 
bank governors based on their social capital and social ties leads to higher nonperforming loans, and 
subsequently, financial instability. This result is contrary to our expectation. One explanation for this 
result is that central bank governors that have strong social capital can make financial institutions lend 
money to business owners that have social ties with the central bank governor and these business owners 
may not repay their loans. The PD coefficient is also negative and significant, which indicates that the 
financial system has higher nonperforming loans during the tenure of a Central bank governor that has 
knowledge in disciplines other than economics. This may be attributed to lack of knowledge in 
economics which is essential for effective macroeconomic management. As expected, INT coefficient 
is positive and significant, which suggest that high real interest rate makes lending costlier and increases 
the cost of financial intermediation which, in turn, can trigger defaults on loan repayments and can lead 
to financial instability (Ajello et al, 2016; Woodford, 2012; Ellis and Littrell, 2017). 
Using the ‘CAR’ variable as the dependent variable for financial stability in Column 3 of Table 2, the 
PE coefficient is positive and significant, which indicates that there is a positive association between 
regulatory capital ratios and a central bank governor’s technical knowledge in economics. This implies 
that the financial system has higher regulatory capital ratios when the central bank governor has a PhD 
in economics which signals his/her technical competence. The other competence variables (EE, EA and 
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PD coefficients) are insignificant. As expected, the INT coefficient is positive and significant, which 
suggest that high real interest rates make lending costlier and increase the cost of financial 
intermediation, which will make regulators increase the regulatory capital ratios that banks have to keep 
in anticipation of loan defaults due to high interests. 
Using the ‘CRISIS’ variable as the dependent variable for financial stability in Column 4 of Table 2, 
the competence variables (PE, EE, EA and PD coefficients) are insignificant. The AGE coefficient is 
negative and significant, which indicates that there is a negative relationship between older central bank 
governors and financial crises, which implies that there are fewer financial crises during the tenure of 
older central bank governors. Also, the INT coefficient is positive and significant, which suggest that 
high real interest rates can increase the cost of lending and can trigger a liquidity crisis which can also 
lead to a system-wide financial crisis. Using the ‘RISK’ variable as the dependent variable for financial 
stability in Column 5 of Table 2, the result is not significant for all the variables. 
Table 2: Effect of competence on financial stability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 LLC NPL CAR CRISIS RISK 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
C 24.987 
(1.43) 
7.417* 
(1.83) 
11.899*** 
(5.18) 
0.641** 
(2.60) 
16.263*** 
(5.31) 
PE -5.517 
(-0.79) 
1.182 
(0.70) 
1.697* 
(1.78) 
0.035 
(0.33) 
-1.379 
(-1.07) 
EE -3.408 
(-0.54) 
2.675* 
(1.94) 
1.006 
(1.29) 
0.131 
(1.49) 
-0.732 
(-0.68) 
EA 2.729 
(0.50) 
-1.255 
(-0.97) 
0.782 
(1.08) 
-0.077 
(-0.91) 
1.031 
(1.05) 
PD -14.203** 
(-1.98) 
-3.713** 
(-2.17) 
1.508 
(1.54) 
0.093 
(0.78) 
-1.077 
(-0.81) 
AGE 0.756*** 
(2.84) 
-0.014 
(-0.23) 
0.019 
(0.55) 
-0.009*** 
(2.61) 
-0.029 
(-0.61) 
GDPR 1.077* 
(1.86) 
0.054 
(0.36) 
-0.041 
(-0.45) 
-0.014 
(-1.64) 
0.024 
(0.22) 
INF 0.198 
(0.96) 
-0.029 
(-0.28) 
0.063 
(0.95) 
0.0013 
(0.43) 
-0.058 
(1.52) 
INT -0.403 
(-1.18) 
0.160* 
(1.68) 
-0.123* 
(-1.91) 
0.015*** 
(2.86) 
-0.058 
(0.93) 
      
R2 84.94 64.19 64.17 47.86 74.06 
Adjusted R2 81.63 56.20 57.17 35.95 68.81 
F-statistic 25.61 8.04 8.14 4.02 14.12 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 206 204 199 200 221 
      
The results in table 2 are estimated using fixed effect regression. Country and period fixed effect were applied. ***, **, * 
represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10%. 
 
5.2. Gender analysis 
5.2.1. Direct gender effect 
This section reports the regression results for the effect of gender on financial stability. Two binary 
variables were introduced into the model namely: the ‘MALE’ and ‘FEMALE’ binary variables. The 
‘MALE’ binary variable takes the value ‘1’ if the central bank governor is male, and ‘0’ otherwise. The 
‘FEMALE’ binary variable takes the value ‘1’ if the central bank governor is male, and ‘0’ otherwise.  
The MALE coefficient is negative and significant in column 2 of table 3 when the level of 
nonperforming loans (NPL) is the indicator of financial stability. The neg
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variable suggest that NPLs are lower during tenure of a male central bank governor. This implies that 
the financial system is more stable during the tenure of a male central bank governor. This is contrary 
to our expectation that female chief executives are more risk averse and conservative than their male 
counterparts (Faccio et al, 2016; Zeng and Wang, 2015.) Also, the MALE coefficient is positive and 
significant in column 3 of table 3 when the level of regulatory capital ratio (CAR) is used as the indicator 
of financial stability. The positive coefficient of the MALE variable suggest that regulatory capital 
ratios are higher during tenure of a male central bank governor. This implies that the financial system 
is well-capitalised and more stable during the tenure of a male central bank governor.  
Table 3. Effect of being a male governor on financial stability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 LLC NPL CAR CRISIS RISK 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
C 13.098 
(0.54) 
14.192** 
(2.57) 
7.874*** 
(2.50) 
0.205 
(0.55) 
16.244*** 
(3.88) 
MALE 5.057 
(0.71) 
-2.855* 
(-1.79) 
1.698* 
(1.86) 
0.196 
(1.54) 
0.009 
(0.01) 
PE -1.927 
(-0.22) 
-0.735 
(-0.37) 
2.858** 
(2.52) 
0.171 
(1.23) 
-1.373 
(-0.89) 
EE -2.416 
(-0.38) 
2.136 
(1.52) 
1.304* 
(1.66) 
0.157* 
(1.78) 
-0.730 
(-0.67) 
EA 1.335 
(0.23) 
-0.407 
(-0.29) 
0.277 
(0.36) 
-0.137 
(-1.47) 
1.029 
(0.98) 
PD -12.84* 
(-1.72) 
-4.514** 
(-2.56) 
1.986** 
(1.98) 
0.151 
(1.22) 
-1.075 
(-0.78) 
AGE 0.869*** 
(2.79) 
-0.075 
(-1.08) 
0.055 
(1.41) 
-0.006 
(-1.33) 
-0.029 
(-0.53) 
GDPR 1.100* 
(1.89) 
0.038 
(0.25) 
-0.037 
(-0.42) 
-0.012 
(-1.41) 
0.024 
(0.22) 
INF 0.184 
(0.88) 
-0.023 
(-0.22) 
0.060 
(0.92) 
0.001 
(0.22) 
-0.058 
(1.51) 
INT -0.411 
(-1.20) 
0.170* 
(1.79) 
-0.126** 
(-1.99) 
0.014*** 
(2.73) 
-0.058 
(0.93) 
      
R2 84.99 64.87 65.91 48.61 74.06 
Adjusted R2 81.57 56.77 57.81 36.48 68.64 
F-statistic 24.87 8.02 8.14 4.01 13.67 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 206 204 199 200 221 
      
The results in table 3 are estimated using fixed effect regression. Country and period fixed effect were applied. ***, **, * 
represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10%. 
 
The FEMALE coefficient is positive and significant in column 2 of table 4 when the level of 
nonperforming loans (NPL) is the indicator of financial stability. The positive coefficient of the 
FEMALE variable suggest that NPLs are higher during tenure of a female central bank governor. This 
implies that the financial system is less stable during the tenure of a female central bank governor. This 
is contrary to our expectation that female chief executives are more risk averse and conservative than 
their male counterparts (Faccio et al, 2016; Zeng and Wang, 2015). Also, the FEMALE coefficient is 
negative and significant in column 3 of table 4 when the level of regulatory capital ratio (CAR) is the 
indicator of financial stability. The negative coefficient of the FEMALE variable suggest that regulatory 
capital ratios are lower during tenure of a female Central bank governor. This implies that the financial 
system may be under-capitalised and less stable during the tenure of a female central bank governor.  
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Table 4: Effect of being a female governor on financial stability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 LLC NPL CAR CRISIS RISK 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
C 18.156 
(0.91) 
14.192** 
(2.57) 
7.874*** 
(2.50) 
0.205 
(0.55) 
16.244*** 
(3.88) 
FEMALE -5.057 
(-0.71) 
2.855* 
(1.79) 
-1.698* 
(-1.86) 
-0.196 
(-1.54) 
0.009 
(0.01) 
PE -1.927 
(-0.22) 
-0.735 
(-0.37) 
2.858** 
(2.52) 
0.171 
(1.23) 
-1.373 
(-0.89) 
EE -2.416 
(-0.38) 
2.136 
(1.52) 
1.304* 
(1.66) 
0.157* 
(1.78) 
-0.730 
(-0.67) 
EA 1.335 
(0.23) 
-0.407 
(-0.29) 
0.277 
(0.36) 
-0.137 
(-1.47) 
1.029 
(0.98) 
PD -12.84* 
(-1.72) 
-4.514** 
(-2.56) 
1.986** 
(1.98) 
0.151 
(1.22) 
-1.075 
(-0.78) 
AGE 0.869*** 
(2.79) 
-0.075 
(-1.08) 
0.055 
(1.41) 
-0.006 
(-1.33) 
-0.029 
(-0.53) 
GDPR 1.100* 
(1.89) 
0.038 
(0.25) 
-0.037 
(-0.42) 
-0.012 
(-1.41) 
0.024 
(0.22) 
INF 0.184 
(0.88) 
-0.023 
(-0.22) 
0.060 
(0.92) 
0.001 
(0.22) 
-0.058 
(1.51) 
INT -0.411 
(-1.20) 
0.170* 
(1.79) 
-0.126** 
(-1.99) 
0.014*** 
(2.73) 
-0.058 
(0.93) 
      
R2 84.99 64.87 65.91 48.61 74.06 
Adjusted R2 81.57 56.77 57.81 36.48 68.64 
F-statistic 24.87 8.02 8.14 4.01 13.67 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 206 204 199 200 221 
      
The results in table 4 are estimated using fixed effect regression. Country and period fixed effect were applied. ***, **, * 
represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10%. 
 
5.2.2. Combined effect of gender and cognitive ability 
The EE*FEMALE coefficient is positive and significant in column 2 and 6 of table 5 when the level of 
loan loss coverage (LLC) and regulatory capital ratios (CAR) are the indicators of financial stability. 
The positive coefficient of the EE*FEMALE variable suggest that the financial system has higher loan 
loss coverage and high regulatory capital levels, and is therefore stable, during the tenure of a female 
central bank governor that has high cognitive abilities. This implies that the financial system is more 
stable during the tenure of a female central bank governor that has high cognitive abilities. Also, the 
EE*FEMALE coefficient is negative and significant in column 4 of table 5 when the level of 
nonperforming loans (NPL) is the indicator of financial stability. The negative coefficient of the 
EE*FEMALE variable suggest that the financial system has fewer nonperforming loans, and is 
therefore stable, during the tenure of a female central bank governor that has high cognitive abilities. 
Also, the EE*MALE coefficient is negative and significant in column 1 and 5 of table 5 when the level 
of loan loss coverage (LLC) and regulatory capital ratios (CAR) are the indicators of financial stability. 
The negative coefficient of the EE*MALE variable suggest that the financial system has fewer loan 
loss coverage and low regulatory capital levels, and is therefore unstable, during the tenure of a male 
central bank governor that has high cognitive abilities. This implies that the financial system is less 
stable during the tenure of a male central bank governor that has high cognitive abilities. However, the 
EE*MALE coefficient is positive and significant in column 3 of table 5 when the level of 
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nonperforming loans (NPL) is the indicator of financial stability. The positive coefficient of the 
EE*MALE variable suggest that the financial system has higher nonperforming loans, and is therefore 
unstable, during the tenure of a male central bank governor that has high cognitive abilities. 
Table 5 – Effect of governor’s gender and cognitive ability on financial stability 
 LLC NPL CAR CRISIS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
C -8.860 
(-0.36) 
12.214 
(0.63) 
18.295*** 
(3.18) 
12.935*** 
(2.82) 
5.686* 
(1.73) 
8.711*** 
(3.34) 
0.252 
(0.63) 
0.419 
(1.42) 
MALE 21.074*** 
(2.63) 
 -5.359*** 
(-2.79) 
 3.025*** 
(2.74) 
 0.168 
(1.12) 
 
EE*MALE -50.885*** 
(-3.87) 
 6.635** 
(2.28) 
 -3.449** 
(-2.08) 
 0.076 
(0.35) 
 
FEMALE  -21.074*** 
(-2.63) 
 5.359*** 
(2.79) 
 -3.025*** 
(-2.74) 
 -0.168 
(-1.12) 
EE*FEMALE  50.885*** 
(3.88) 
 -6.635*** 
(-2.28) 
 3.449** 
(2.08) 
 -0.076 
(-0.35) 
PE 5.105 
(0.59) 
5.105 
(0.59) 
-1.929 
(-0.95) 
-1.929 
(-0.95) 
3.499*** 
(3.01) 
3.499*** 
(3.01) 
0.157 
(1.08) 
0.157 
(1.08) 
EE 43.615*** 
(3.25) 
-7.269 
(-1.15) 
-4.083 
(-1.33) 
2.552* 
(1.82) 
4.513*** 
(2.62) 
1.064 
(1.35) 
0.085 
(0.37) 
0.161* 
(1.79) 
EA -4.375 
(-0.76) 
-4.376 
(-0.76) 
0.295 
(0.21) 
0.295 
(0.21) 
-0.076 
(-0.09) 
-0.076 
(-0.09) 
-0.129 
(-1.34) 
-0.129 
(-1.34) 
PD -7.884 
(-1.08) 
-7.884 
(-1.08) 
-5.166*** 
(-2.93) 
-5.166*** 
(-2.93) 
2.349** 
(2.33) 
2.349** 
(2.33) 
0.142 
(1.11) 
0.142 
(1.11) 
AGE 0.951*** 
(3.18) 
0.951*** 
(3.18) 
-0.097 
(-1.39) 
-0.097 
(-1.39) 
0.067* 
(1.72) 
0.067* 
(1.72) 
-0.006 
(-1.36) 
-0.006 
(-1.36) 
GDPR 1.094* 
(1.96) 
1.094* 
(1.96) 
0.051 
(0.34) 
0.051 
(0.34) 
-0.047 
(-0.53) 
-0.047 
(-0.53) 
-0.012 
(-1.39) 
-0.012 
(-1.39) 
INF 0.128 
(0.64) 
0.128 
(0.64) 
0.003 
(0.03) 
0.003 
(0.03) 
0.046 
(0.72) 
0.046 
(0.72) 
0.001 
(0.24) 
0.001 
(0.24) 
INT -0.215 
(-0.64) 
-0.215 
(-0.65) 
0.141 
(1.48) 
0.141 
(1.48) 
-0.108* 
(-1.69) 
-0.108* 
(-1.69) 
0.014*** 
(2.65) 
0.014*** 
(2.65) 
         
R2 86.24 86.24 65.95 65.95 66.81 66.81 48.65 48.65 
Adjusted R2 83.00 83.00 57.85 57.85 58.67 58.67 36.13 36.13 
F-statistic 26.67 26.67 8.14 8.14 8.21 8.21 3.89 3.89 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 206 206 204 204 199 199 200 200 
         
The results in table 5 are estimated using fixed effect regression. Country and period fixed effect were applied. ***, **, * represent 
significance at 1%, 5%, 10%. 
 
5.2.3. Combined effect of gender and social capital 
The EA*FEMALE coefficient is positive and significant in column 2 and 6 of table 6 when the level of 
loan loss coverage (LLC) and regulatory capital ratios (CAR) are the indicators of financial stability. 
The positive coefficient of the EA*FEMALE variable suggest that the financial system has higher loan 
loss coverage and high regulatory capital levels, and is therefore stable, during the tenure of a female 
central bank governor that has high social capital or strong social ties. This implies that the financial 
system is more stable during the tenure of a female central bank governor that has high social capital or 
strong social ties. However, the EA*FEMALE coefficient is not significant when the level of 
nonperforming loans (NPL) is the indicator of financial stability in column 4.  
Also, the EA*MALE coefficient is negative and significant in column 1 and 5 of table 6 when the level 
of loan loss coverage (LLC) and regulatory capital ratios (CAR) are the indicators of financial stability. 
The negative coefficient of the EA*MALE variable suggest that the financial system has fewer loan 
P.K. Ozili                                Does competence of central bank governors influence financial stability 
18 
 
loss coverage and low regulatory capital levels, and is therefore unstable, during the tenure of a male 
central bank governor that has high social capital or strong social ties. This implies that the financial 
system is less stable during the tenure of a male central bank governor that has high social capital or 
strong social ties. However, the EA*MALE coefficient is not significant when the level of 
nonperforming loans (NPL) is the indicator of financial stability in column 3.  
Table 6 – Effect of governor’s gender and social capital on financial stability 
 LLC NPL CAR CRISIS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
C -11.719 
(-0.44) 
8.255 
(0.41) 
17.833*** 
(2.97) 
12.725*** 
(2.73) 
5.699* 
(1.67) 
8.747*** 
(3.32) 
0.015 
(0.03) 
0.419 
(1.42) 
MALE 19.975** 
(2.02) 
 -5.108** 
(-2.36) 
 3.047** 
(2.48) 
 0.299 
(1.45) 
 
EA*MALE -26.348** 
(-2.17) 
 4.392 
(1.54) 
 -2.643* 
(-1.64) 
 -0.142 
(-0.64) 
 
FEMALE  -19.975 
(-2.02) 
 5.108** 
(2.36) 
 -3.047*** 
(-2.48) 
 -0.299 
(-1.45) 
EA*FEMALE  26.348*** 
(2.17) 
 -4.391 
(-1.54) 
 2.643* 
(1.64) 
 0.142 
(0.64) 
PE 0.297 
(0.03) 
0.297 
(0.03) 
-0.906 
(-0.46) 
-0.906 
(-0.46) 
2.931** 
(2.59) 
2.931** 
(2.59) 
0.195 
(1.35) 
0.195 
(1.35) 
EE 1.648 
(0.25) 
1.648 
(0.25) 
1.318 
(0.88) 
1.318 
(0.88) 
1.771** 
(2.13) 
1.771** 
(2.13) 
0.189* 
(1.86) 
0.189* 
(1.86) 
EA 21.220* 
(1.96) 
21.220* 
(1.96) 
-3.831 
(-1.47) 
0.561 
(0.37) 
2.374 
(1.59) 
-0.268 
(-0.323) 
-0.037 
(-0.21) 
-0.179 
(-1.57) 
PD -11.375 
(-1.54) 
-11.375 
(-1.54) 
-4.642*** 
(-2.64) 
-4.642*** 
(-2.64) 
2.084** 
(2.08) 
2.084** 
(2.08) 
0.163 
(1.29) 
0.163 
(1.29) 
AGE 1.035*** 
(3.27) 
1.035*** 
(3.27) 
-0.100 
(-1.41) 
-0.100 
(-1.41) 
0.071* 
(1.75) 
0.071* 
(1.75) 
-0.004 
(-0.89) 
-0.004 
(-0.89) 
GDPR 1.130* 
(1.96) 
1.130* 
(1.96) 
0.035 
(0.24) 
0.035 
(0.24) 
-0.034 
(-0.39) 
-0.034 
(-0.39) 
-0.011 
(-1.36) 
-0.011 
(-1.36) 
INF 0.099 
(0.48) 
0.099 
(0.48) 
0.012 
(0.12) 
0.012 
(0.12) 
0.038 
(0.56) 
0.038 
(0.56) 
0.0001 
(0.03) 
0.0001 
(0.03) 
INT -0.291 
(-0.85) 
-0.291 
(-0.85) 
0.148 
(1.55) 
0.148 
(1.55) 
-0.112* 
(-1.75) 
-0.112* 
(-1.75) 
0.014*** 
(2.78) 
0.014*** 
(2.78) 
         
R2 85.40 86.24 65.37 65.95 66.47 66.47 48.65 48.65 
Adjusted R2 81.97 83.00 57.13 57.85 58.25 58.25 36.13 36.13 
F-statistic 24.89 26.67 7.94 8.14 8.08 8.08 3.89 3.89 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 206 206 204 204 199 199 200 200 
         
The results in table 6 are estimated using fixed effect regression. Country and period fixed effect were applied. ***, **, * represent 
significance at 1%, 5%, 10%. 
 
5.2.4. Discussion on male dominance in central bank leadership 
The findings in section 5.2.1 suggest that regulatory capital ratios are higher during tenure of a male 
Central bank governor than a female Central bank governor, which implies that the financial system is 
well-capitalised and, therefore, more stable during the tenure of a male central bank governor. We are 
aware that this result may seem questionable at first, and may evoke unpleasant reactions from gender 
equality advocates who may interpret this to mean that men are better at being central bank governors 
than women. Such interpretation, although confirmed by the data used for this study, does not 
necessarily mean that financial crises are more frequent during the tenure of female central bank 
governors. No! Rather the result points to the strong gender bias that favour male appointees in the 
political system of many countries which also influence the selection of a male or female central bank 
governors. Although some developing and transition countries in our sample have the Central bank 
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governor position being dominated by men and old economists, we also observed that women have 
recently begin to occupy the Central bank governor positions in more advanced economies, and the 
number of female governors is expected to increase in the near future.   
 
5.3. Further analyses 
5.3.1. Combined effect of cognitive ability, social capital and technical competence 
This section tests the combined effect of cognitive ability, social capital and technical competence on 
financial stability. The PE*EA*EE coefficient is positive when LLC is the dependent variable in 
column 1 of table 7. This suggest that the financial system is stable during the tenure of a central bank 
governor that has high cognitive ability, technical competence and social competence, combined. 
Similarly, the PE*EA*EE coefficient is negative when NPL is the dependent variable in column 2. This 
suggest that the financial system is stable during the tenure of a central bank governor that has high 
cognitive ability, technical competence and social competence, combined. 
Table 7 – Effect of knowledge (PE), cognitive ability (EE) and social capital (EA) on financial stability (SB) 
 LLC NPL CAR CRISIS RISK 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
C 66.326*** 
(3.83) 
8.255 
(0.41) 
11.568*** 
(4.56) 
0.434* 
(1.63) 
4.405*** 
(0.00) 
PE*EA -19.697 
(-1.42) 
1.165 
(0.36) 
-2.138* 
(-1.88) 
0.009 
(0.05) 
-0.158 
(-0.06) 
PE*EE -72.474*** 
(-5.66) 
7.577** 
(2.37) 
0.225 
(0.12) 
0.522** 
(2.49) 
3.712 
(1.46) 
PE*EA*EE 82.212*** 
(5.59) 
-6.347* 
(-1.73) 
1.506 
(0.71) 
-0.395* 
(-1.67) 
-1.830 
(-0.63) 
PE -0.809 
(-0.09) 
0.372 
(0.17) 
2.374* 
(1.88) 
0.005 
(0.04) 
1.794 
(1.09) 
EE 5.064 
(0.69) 
0.954 
(0.52) 
0.585 
(0.55) 
0.007 
(0.05) 
-1.917 
(-1.35) 
EA 0.940 
(0.17) 
-1.141 
(-0.79) 
1.064 
(1.30) 
-0.056 
(-0.60) 
1.048 
(0.94) 
PD -8.189 
(-1.20) 
-4.231** 
(-2.45) 
1.672* 
(1.68) 
0.051 
(0.42) 
-1.305 
(-0.96) 
AGE 0.034 
(0.12) 
0.051 
(0.77) 
0.022 
(0.57) 
-0.006 
(-1.44) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
GDPR 0.802* 
(1.53) 
0.073 
(0.49) 
-0.041 
(-0.46) 
-0.013 
(-1.49) 
0.035 
(0.32) 
INF 0.166 
(0.87) 
-0.046 
(-0.43) 
0.076 
(1.11) 
0.002 
(0.58) 
-0.059 
(-1.49) 
INT -0.376 
(-1.22) 
0.141 
(1.47) 
-0.123* 
(-1.91) 
0.013** 
(2.52) 
-0.068 
(-1.07) 
      
R2 88.01 86.24 65.46 49.92 74.42 
Adjusted R2 85.10 57.11 56.72 37.32 68.73 
F-statistic 30.27 7.75 7.48 3.96 13.09 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 206 204 199 200 221 
      
The results in table 7 are estimated using fixed effect regression. Country and period fixed effect were applied. ***, **, * 
represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10%. 
 
 
5.3.2. Comparing developed and developing countries 
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Here, the sample is divided into two categories: ‘developed countries’ and ‘developing and transition 
countries’. The DV binary variable was introduced to represent developed countries while the DN 
binary variable was introduced to represent developing and transition countries. The DV variable takes 
the value ‘1’ if the country is a developed country and ‘0’ otherwise. The DN variable takes the value 
‘1’ if the country is a developing country and ‘0’ otherwise. The DV and DN binary variables are then 
interacted with the competence variables to determine their effects on financial stability. The results are 
reported in table 8. 
For the developed countries category, the DV*PE, DV*EE and DV*EA coefficients are positive and 
significant in column 1 when LLC is the indicator of financial stability, which indicates that the financial 
system of developed countries is more stable during the tenure of a central bank governor that has good 
cognitive ability, social capital and technical competence in economics. Also, the DV*EE coefficient 
is positive and significant when ‘CRISIS’ and ‘RISK’ variables are used as indicators of financial 
stability, which indicates that the financial system of developed countries is more stable during the 
tenure of a central bank governor that has good cognitive ability. On the other hand, the DV*PD 
coefficient is positive and significant in column 2 when NPL is the indicator of financial stability, 
indicating that the financial system of developed countries has high NPLs during the tenure of a central 
bank governor that has knowledge in disciplines other than economics. 
Table 8 - Effect of competence on financial stability in developed countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 LLC NPL CAR CRISIS RISK 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
C 65.395*** 
(2.67) 
14.799*** 
(3.54) 
20.654*** 
(8.89) 
0.229 
(1.19) 
5.636 
(1.54) 
DV -28.871 
(-1.38) 
-12.428*** 
(-3.97) 
1.097 
(0.62) 
-0.091 
(-0.62) 
0.007 
(0.003) 
DV*PE 76.243*** 
(4.13) 
3.810 
(1.28) 
-1.110 
(-0.66) 
0.012 
(0.09) 
6.266** 
(2.31) 
DV*EE 79.961*** 
(4.13) 
4.347 
(1.60) 
0.292 
(0.19) 
0.459*** 
(3.52) 
6.349*** 
(2.60) 
DV*EA 40.523*** 
(2.61) 
2.775 
(1.08) 
-1.958 
(-1.36) 
-0.299** 
(-2.28) 
-9.423*** 
(-4.11) 
DV*PD -28.800 
(-1.36) 
7.062** 
(2.18) 
-2.792 
(-1.52) 
-0.069 
(-0.45) 
1.487 
(0.51) 
PE -32.129*** 
(-2.75) 
-2.407 
(-1.18) 
1.060 
(0.93) 
0.115 
(1.18) 
4.905*** 
(2.66) 
EE 48.295*** 
(5.83) 
0.649 
(0.44) 
-0.882 
(-1.06) 
0.066 
(0.96) 
-4.771*** 
(-3.64) 
EA 48.295*** 
(5.83) 
-3.035** 
(-2.35) 
1.859*** 
(2.49) 
-0.188*** 
(-3.35) 
1.299 
(1.19) 
PD -9.813 
(-0.84) 
-2.775 
(-1.36) 
0.402 
(0.35) 
0.115 
(1.17) 
1.869 
(1.01) 
AGE 0.776* 
(1.92) 
-0.077 
(-1.17) 
-0.115*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.002 
(-0.76) 
0.061 
(1.05) 
GDPR -0.330 
(-0.37) 
0.121 
(0.73) 
-0.115 
(-1.17) 
-0.014* 
(-1.96) 
0.359*** 
(2.59) 
INF -0.758** 
(-2.24) 
0.038 
(0.39) 
0.109* 
(1.86) 
0.002 
(0.84) 
-0.091* 
(-1.71) 
INT -1.969 
(-3.52) 
0.189* 
(1.72) 
-0.181** 
(-2.70) 
0.012*** 
(2.64) 
-0.017 
(-0.19) 
R2 45.04 31.55 34.84 42.77 33.67 
Adjusted R2 35.98 20.14 23.66 33.01 23.60 
F-statistic 4.973 2.76 3.11 4.38 3.34 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 206 204 199 200 221 
The results in table 8 are estimated using fixed effect regression. Only period fixed effect was applied. ***, **, * 
represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10%. 
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For the developing countries category, the DN*PE, DN*EE and DN*EA coefficients are negative and 
significant in column 1 when LLC is the indicator of financial stability, which indicates that the financial 
system of developing countries is less stable during the tenure of a central bank governor that has good 
cognitive ability, social capital and technical competence in economics. Also, the DN*EE coefficient 
is negative and significant when ‘CRISIS’ and ‘RISK’ variables are used as indicators of financial 
stability, which indicates that the financial system of developing countries is less stable during the 
tenure of a central bank governor that has good cognitive ability. On the other hand, the DN*PD 
coefficient is negative and significant in column 2 when NPL is the indicator of financial stability, 
indicating that the financial system of developing countries has fewer NPLs during the tenure of a 
central bank governor that has knowledge in disciplines other than economics (see table 9). 
Table 9 – Effect of competence on financial stability in developing countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 LLC NPL CAR CRISIS RISK 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
C 36.524 
(1.13) 
2.371 
(0.48) 
21.752*** 
(8.08) 
0.139 
(0.62) 
5.644 
(1.30) 
DN 28.871 
(1.38) 
12.428*** 
(-3.97) 
-1.097 
(-0.62) 
0.091 
(0.62) 
-0.007 
(-0.003) 
DN*PE -76.243*** 
(-4.13) 
-3.810 
(-1.28) 
1.110 
(0.66) 
-0.012 
(-0.09) 
-6.266** 
(-2.31) 
DN*EE 79.961*** 
(4.47) 
-4.347 
(-1.60) 
0.292 
(0.19) 
-0.459*** 
(-3.52) 
-6.349*** 
(-2.60) 
DN*EA -40.523*** 
(-2.61) 
-2.775 
(-1.08) 
1.958 
(1.36) 
0.299** 
(2.28) 
9.423*** 
(4.11) 
DN*PD 28.800 
(1.36) 
-7.062** 
(-2.18) 
2.792 
(1.52) 
-0.069 
(-0.45) 
-1.487 
(-0.51) 
PE 44.114*** 
(3.11) 
1.403 
(0.64) 
-0.050 
(-0.04) 
0.128 
(1.19) 
11.171*** 
(5.64) 
EE -31.666** 
(-2.01) 
4.996** 
(2.21) 
-0.591 
(-0.47) 
0.525*** 
(4.77) 
1.578 
(0.77) 
EA -8.586 
(-0.62) 
-0.259 
(-0.12) 
-0.099 
(-0.08) 
-0.488*** 
(-4.16) 
-8.124*** 
(-4.02) 
PD -38.614** 
(-2.17) 
4.286* 
(1.72) 
-2.389* 
(-1.71) 
0.045 
(0.39) 
3.357 
(1.48) 
AGE 0.776* 
(1.92) 
-0.077 
(-1.17) 
-0.115*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.002 
(-0.76) 
0.061 
(1.05) 
GDPR -0.330 
(-0.37) 
0.121 
(0.73) 
-0.115 
(-1.17) 
-0.014* 
(-1.96) 
0.359*** 
(2.59) 
INF -0.758** 
(-2.24) 
0.038 
(0.39) 
0.109* 
(1.86) 
0.002 
(0.84) 
-0.091* 
(-1.71) 
INT -1.969 
(-3.52) 
0.189* 
(1.72) 
-0.181** 
(-2.70) 
0.012*** 
(2.64) 
-0.017 
(-0.19) 
      
R2 45.04 31.55 34.84 42.77 33.67 
Adjusted R2 35.98 20.14 23.66 33.01 23.60 
F-statistic 4.973 2.76 3.11 4.38 3.34 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 206 204 199 200 221 
      
The results in table 9 are estimated using fixed effect regression. Only period fixed effect was applied. ***, **, * 
represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10%. 
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6. Conclusion 
This study examined whether the competence of a central bank governor affects financial system 
stability. The findings reveal that the financial system is more stable when the central bank governor is 
older and male. The findings also reveal that the financial system is stable during the tenure of a central 
bank governor that has a combination of cognitive ability, social capital and technical competence in 
economics. The findings from the gender analyses reveal that the financial system is more stable when 
the central bank governor is male. However, further analyses reveal that the financial system is also 
stable during the tenure of a female central bank governor that has strong social capital or high cognitive 
abilities while the financial system is relatively less stable during the tenure of a male central bank 
governor that has strong social capital or high cognitive abilities. 
Comparing developed countries to developing and transition countries, the findings reveal that the 
financial system of developed countries is more stable during the tenure of a central bank governor that 
has good cognitive ability, social capital and technical competence in economics while the financial 
system of developing and transition countries is less stable during the tenure of a central bank governor 
that has good cognitive ability, social capital and technical competence in economics. Also, there is 
evidence that the financial system of developing and transition countries is more stable during the tenure 
of a central bank governor that has knowledge in disciplines other than economics. The implication of 
the findings is that the competence of central bank governors matters for financial stability but this 
depends on how the central bank governor’s competence is measured.  
Moreover, the dynamics of competence and financial stability may be influenced by complex 
socioeconomic mechanisms that differ from country to country. The competence of central bank 
governors may be affected by families’ social background, occupation, income and wealth of the central 
bank governor, while stability in the financial system may be influenced by high corruption, weak 
supervisory processes, high political interference in financial regulation and regulatory arbitrage in the 
financial system. These complex socioeconomic factors may alter the relationship between competence 
and financial stability.   
Future research can examine how complex socioeconomic factors influence the relationship between 
Central bank governors’ competence and financial stability. Future research studies can also examine 
the influence of other personality traits that could potentially influence the stability of the banking 
sector. Some personality traits can make the central bank governor exercise excessive caution in 
financial stability decision-making than others. Finally, the limitation of the study relates to the choice 
of competence indicators and the choice of countries. Firstly, our measures of competence may be too 
narrow and may not capture other broad dimensions of competence. Secondly, there is the possibility 
that some relevant competence variables are omitted. Thirdly, the choice of countries could be expanded 
to include more countries that have had a female central bank governor. 
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Appendix 
 
List of Tables 
A1: Descriptive Statistics 
 RISK NPL LLC CAR CRISIS PE EE EA MALE FEMALE AGE PD 
 Mean  13.32  6.237  62.95  14.92  0.149  0.482  0.309  0.456  0.787  0.213  55 0.419 
 Median  13.23  3.656  51.10  14.50  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.000  56 0.000 
 Maximum  38.48  37.30  176.90  31.10  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  79 1.000 
 Minimum  0.46  0.40  7.52  1.75  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  36 0.000 
 Std. Dev.  6.04  6.42  41.86  3.75  0.357  0.501  0.463  0.357  0.410  0.410  8 0.494 
 Skewness  0.58  1.83  0.68  0.77  1.96 0.073  0.827  0.177  -1.400 1.400  0.09 0.328 
 Observations 272  272 272 272 272  272  272  272 272  272  272 272 
LLC = loan loss coverage ratio (%); CRISIS = banking crisis dummy variable (1=banking crisis, 0=none); RISK = Bank z-score; 
NPL = bank nonperforming loans to gross loans ratio (%); CAR = bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets ratio (%); PE = 
Competence in macroeconomic management; EE = educated in a global elite university or institution; EA = educated in a foreign 
university or institution; AGE = the age of the central bank governor; MALE = a binary variable that take the value 1 if the head 
regulator is male, and zero if female; FEMALE = a binary variable that take the value 1 if the head regulator is female, and zero is 
male. PD = having knowledge in disciplines other than economics. 
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Sample descriptive statistics 
A2: Description of Variables 
Variable Indicator Name Long definition Source 
LLC Provisions to 
nonperforming 
loans (%) 
Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio.  Financial Soundness Indicators 
Database (fsi.imf.org), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) 
CRISIS Banking crisis 
dummy 
(1=banking crisis, 
0=none) 
A banking crisis is defined as systemic if two 
conditions are met: a. Significant signs of financial 
distress in the banking system (as indicated by 
significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, 
and/or bank liquidations), b. Significant banking policy 
intervention measures in response to significant losses 
in the banking system.  
Laeven, L. and Valencia, F. (2013), 
“Systemic Banking Crises 
Database: An Update”, IMF 
WP/12/163 
RISK Bank Z-score It captures the probability of default of a country's 
banking system. Z-score compares the buffer of a 
country's banking system (capitalization and returns) 
with the volatility of those returns. dated data from 
Bankscope. 
Bankscope, Bureau van Dijk (BvD) 
NPL Bank 
nonperforming 
loans to gross 
loans (%) 
Non-performing loans to gross loans ratio Financial Soundness Indicators 
Database (fsi.imf.org), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) 
CAR Bank regulatory 
capital to risk-
weighted assets 
(%) 
The ratio of bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted 
assets 
Financial Soundness Indicators 
Database (fsi.imf.org), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) 
PE PE public sources mainly: the official Wikipedia page of 
the governor, online CV or resume of central bank 
governor, and from Central Bank websites. 
public sources mainly: the official 
Wikipedia page of the governor, 
online CV or resume of central 
bank governor, and from Central 
Bank websites. 
EE EE Obtained highest degree from an elite university or 
institution 
public sources mainly: the official 
Wikipedia page of the governor, 
online CV or resume of central 
bank governor, and from Central 
Bank websites 
EA EA Obtained foreign education public sources mainly: the official 
Wikipedia page of the governor, 
online CV or resume of central 
bank governor, and from Central 
Bank websites 
AGE AGE Age of the central bank governor, and from Central 
Bank websites 
Publicly available information 
MALE  Gender: Male Gender of the central bank governor, and from Central 
Bank websites 
Publicly available information 
FEMALE  Gender: Female 
(FM) 
Gender of the central bank governor, and from Central 
Bank websites 
Publicly available information 
 
